The priority problem of incomplete preference relations is investigated. Using the transformation relation between multiplicative preference relation and fuzzy preference relation, we develop a least-square model to obtain the collective priority vector of the incomplete preference relations presented by multiple decision makers, with the existence condition of the solution being developed. Meanwhile, we extend this model to the cases of the fuzzy preference relations with complete information presented by multiple decision makers and the fuzzy preference relation with complete information presented by one decision maker. Finally, it is illustrated by a numerical example that the method proposed is feasible and effective.
Introduction
In the process of multiple attribute decision making, the pairwise comparison method [1] [2] [3] [4] may be used to rank a finite number of alternatives X = {x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n }, n P 2 from best to worst. In order to rank these alternatives, decision makers (DMs) usually express their pairwise comparison information in two formats: a multiplicative preference relation R = (r ij ) n·n [1] , where r ij is an estimate for the relative significance of the alternative x i and x j , and r ij 2[1/9,9], r ij r ji = 1, or a fuzzy preference relation A = (a ij ) n·n [10] , where a ij denotes the preference degree of the alternative x i to x j , and a ij 2 (0,1), a ij + a ji = 1. There are many methods to derive the priority (rank) vector of the multiplicative preference relation, such as the eigenvector method presented by Saaty [1] , the logarithmic least-square method by Crawford and Williams [5] , generalized chi square method by Xu [6] , etc. Xu also gives much research on the priority of the fuzzy preference relation: in [7, 10] , he gets the weighted least-square method, the eigenvector method and the least deviation method for the priority of the fuzzy preference relation.
However, in some practical situations, due to either the uncertainty of objective things, the vague nature of human judgment, or high order of the preference relation [12] , the DMs may obtain a preference relation with entries being incomplete. Up to now, some related theory studies with incomplete preference relations have been given. In [8, 9] , Kwiesielewicz develops a generalized pseudo-inverse approach to preference relation with entries in the form of triangular numbers. In [11] , Xu defines the concept of incomplete complementary preference relation, develops such properties as weak consistent, additive consistent, multiplicative consistent, etc., and presents a priority method for incomplete preference relation; proposes an interactive approach [12] and two goal programming models [13] based on incomplete preference relations. He also presents a method [14] for group decision making with various types of incomplete preference relations. In the previous paragraph we have mentioned that a weighted least-square priority method of the fuzzy preference relation [10] has been proposed by Xu. In this paper, we will extend this method for obtaining the priority vector of the collective preference from incomplete fuzzy preference relations.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we will first give the relationship between multiplicative preference relations and fuzzy complementary preference relations, then we will review briefly some related concepts such as directed graph, strongly connected graph and irreducible matrix, etc. In Section 3, we will propose a least-square priority model of the collective preference relations with incomplete information, with the existence condition of the solution being developed. Meanwhile, we will also extend this model to the cases of the collective preference relations and individual preference relation with complete information. At last, we will give a numerical example and draw some conclusions.
Basic concepts
Consider a set of alternatives X = {X 1 , X 2 , . . . , X n }. For simplicity, let N = {1, 2, . . . , n}. The pairwise comparison of alternatives are given by the DMs. If a preference relation R = (r ij ) n · n satisfies r ii = 1, r ij = 1/r ji , r ij > 0,i, j 2 N, then R is called a reciprocal preference relation. If a reciprocal preference relation satisfies r ij = r ik r kj , i, k, j 2 N, then R is said to have multiplicative consistency. If a preference relation A = (a ij ) n·n satisfies a ii = 0.5, a ij + a ji = 1, a ij > 0,i, j 2 N, i 5 j, then A is called a fuzzy preference relation. If a fuzzy preference relation A satisfies a ik a kj a ji = a ij a jk a ki , i, j, k 2 N, i 5 j 5 k, then A is said to have multiplicative consistency.
The priority method of the reciprocal preference relation with multiplicative consistency proposed by Saaty [1] will be regarded as a lemma of this text.
Lemma 1 [1] . Given R = (r ij ) n·n a reciprocal preference relation with multiplicative consistency, there exists a vector V = (v 1 , v 2 , . . . , v n )
T such that r ij = v i /v j , for all i, j 2 N.
In order to derive the priority vector of the fuzzy preference relation, Xu has investigated the relationship between the reciprocal preference relation and the fuzzy preference relation, which will also be considered as a lemma of this text in the following.
Lemma 2 [10] . The multiplicative consistent reciprocal preference relation R = (r ij ) n·n and the multiplicative consistent fuzzy preference relation A = (a ij ) n·n can be transformed each other by the following formulae:
Given A ¼ ða ij Þ nÂn a multiplicative consistent fuzzy preference relation, by Lemma 2, the relation R = (r ij ) n·n defined by r ij = a ij /a ji is a multiplicative consistent reciprocal preference relation. The priority vector of R, V = (v 1 ,v 2 , . . . ,v n ) T , will be also called the priority vector of the multiplicative consistent fuzzy preference relation A. Moreover, it is satisfied the following relationship:
If some of the entries of a preference relation R cannot be given by the DM, then R is called an incomplete preference relation. Only when there exist the direct or indirect comparisons of every two alternatives, can we utilize this finite information to rank all the alternatives [2, 15] .
For any i, j 2 N, let s ij be ijth entry of the preference relation 
n·n be the indicator matrix of S = (s ij ) n·n , and G be the corresponding graph. If s ij 5 À, obviously, s ji 5À, then d ij = d ji = 1, which denotes that there is comparison information between alternative X i and X j . That is, there exists an arc in G going from v i to v j , and an arc going from v j to v i ; If s ij = À, we have d ij = 0, which denotes that there is no comparison information between alternative X i and X j . For each pair of alternatives X i , X j with i 5 j, when there exists direct or indirect comparison information between X i and X j , there must be a path from v i to v j . That is, the graph G is strongly connected. On the contrary, if the graph G is not strongly connected, which denotes that there is no path from v i 0 to v j 0 for some i 0 , j 0 2 N. In other way, we can say that there is no direct or indirect comparison information between X i 0 and X j 0 , then X i 0 and X j 0 cannot be compared for loss of information. If n P 2, the matrix B is said to be reducible if there is an n · n permutation matrix P such that
where A 11 is of order l, 1 6 l 6 n À 1. If no such P exists then B is irreducible. An irreducible matrix and its directed graph have the following relationship [16] : A square matrix is irreducible if and only if its directed graph is strongly connected.
In consequence, we get the following conclusion: Let A be an incomplete preference relation, D be the indicator matrix of A, G be the directed graph of D, then G is strongly connected () D is irreducible ) all the alternatives can be ranked by A utilizing some approaches.
Least-square model of collective preference relations with incomplete information
Let X = {X 1 , X 2 , . . . , X n } be a set of alternatives, d = {d 1 , d 2 , . . . , d m } be a set of DMs, respectively. For simplicity, we denote N = {1, 2, . . . , n}, M = {1, 2, . . . , m}. The DMs' preferences on X are described by the fuzzy preference relations as follows:
where a ijs denotes the preference degree of alternative X i over X j presented by the sth DM, s 2 M. For some reasons, the DMs may present incomplete information. Therefore, for i 0 , j 0 2 N, s 0 2 M, a i 0 j 0 s 0 is incomplete, and we denote a i 0 j 0 s 0 ¼ À. Suppose that there are d ij DMs presenting the preference degree of alternatives X i over X j (which also denotes that there are d ji DMs presenting the preference degree of alternatives X j over X i because of a ijs = 1 À a jis , obviously, we have d ij = d ji ), it is clear that d ij satisfies 0 6 d ij 6 m.
Let us suppose an ideal case, for a decision-making problem, all the judgment of DMs are unanimous. That is, all DMs present the same fuzzy preference relations. As we have seen, if V = (v 1 , v 2 , . . . , v n )
T is the priority vector of multiplicative consistent fuzzy preference relation A s = (a ijs ) n·n , then a ijs = v i /(v i + v j ), i, j 2 N, s 2 M. Moreover, for a ijs + a jis = 1, we have
Then, for all i, j 2 N, s 2 M, the equation
holds. However, in the general case, DMs may disagrees with each other, then the above equation does not hold. Let e ijs = (a ijs v j À a jis v i ) 2 . For all i, j 2 N, s 2 M, the smaller e ijs , the higher the consensus of the judgments by all DMs. Our objective is to get an optimal priority vector V = {v 1 , v 2 , . . . , v n } T by minimizing the error of e ijs for all i, j 2 N, s 2 M. Therefore, we constructed the following constrained optimization model (where we suppose that all the DMs have the same weights):
However, when the DMs present incomplete information, that is, for some i 0 , j 0 2 N, s 0 2 M, a i 0 j 0 s 0 ¼ À, by deleting all the incomplete information, we get the following optimization model:
where a ijl 5 À denotes that the lth DM presents the preference degree of alternative
The equivalent matrix form is as follows:
there is at least one DM presenting comparison information between alternative x i and x j , so q ij 5 0 can also be explained that there is comparison information between alternative x i and x j . Definitely speaking, if q ij 5 0, then there are d ij 5 0 DMs presenting comparison information between x i and x j . Then, for all i, j 2 N, if there exists direct and indirect comparison information between x i and x j , that is, the graph of Q is strongly connected or the indicator matrix of Q is irreducible, then we can rank all the alternatives {x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n }.
Therefore, we get the following conclusion:
Lemma 3. The graph of Q is strongly connected () the indicator matrix of Q is irreducible ) all the alternatives can be ranked by model (6).
Lemma 4.
If the indicator matrix of Q is irreducible, then Q is a positive define matrix, and Q is invertible.
Proof. Because
and because the indicator of Q is irreducible, by Lemma 3, we can utilize A s , s 2 M and model (6) to rank all the alternatives. That is to say, the priority vector V exists. For V > 0, there must be g(v) > 0. Because Q T = Q, then Q is a positive define matrix. Therefore, Q À1 exists. h By Eq. (9), we have
and
Since e T V = 1, then
That is
By Eq. (10), we have
Thus we get the following theorem: Theorem 1. Let (A s = (a ijs ) i,j2{1,. . .,n} ) s2{1,. . .,m} be a profile of incomplete fuzzy preference relations such that its indicator matrix Q is irreducible. Then the optimal solution of model (6) is as follows:
In fact, Q = (q ij ) n·n can be regarded as a measurement of the incomplete degree of the preference relations. That is to say, for any i,j 2 N,i 5 j, d ij = 0 denotes that no one presents the degree of alternative X i over X j , then q ij = 0; d ij = m, m P 1 denotes that all the DMs present the degree of alternative X i over X j , then q ij 5 0.
We can extended the priority model of incomplete fuzzy preference relations mentioned above to collective decisions and individual decision with complete information.
For any i, j 2 N, if we let d ij = m, where d ij is the number of the DMs presenting the preference degree of alternatives X i over X j , then we can get a collective priority model of the fuzzy preference relations presented by multiple decision makers with complete information:
The priority vector of this model is Eq. (11).
For any i, j 2 M, if we let d ij = 1, we can also get a priority model of individual fuzzy preference relation with complete information:
The priority vector of this model is also Eq. (11), which is the result of literature [10] .
Numerical example
Suppose that three DMs provide the following incomplete preference relations {A 1 , A 2 , A 3 } on a set of four alternatives X = {x 1 , x 2 , x 3 , x 4 }. We also assume that all the DMs have the same weights. Step 1: By the model (6), we get a positive define matrix Q as follows: Step 2: According to Eq. (11), the priority vector of group decision is (v 1 , v 2 , v 3 , v 4 ) T = (0.2360, 0.3036, 0.3349, 0.1255) T . Thus the ranking of group decision is X 3 1 X 2 1 X 1 1 X 4 .
Conclusions
In this paper, using the transformation relation between multiplicative preference relation and fuzzy preference relation, we have developed a least-square priority model of the collective preference relations with incomplete information with the existence condition of the solution being developed. We also extended this model to the cases of the collective preference relations and individual preference relation with complete information. At last, we have given a numerical example. Because the priority model proposed is based on multiplicative consistency of fuzzy preference relation, we can also develop a least logarithmic square approach to fuzzy preference relation based on additive consistency [13] using the same method.
